Japan and Space

Today's blog will take the form of a book review. The book in question is In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy, written by Saadia Pekkanen, Paul Kallender-Umezu, two self-professed enthusiasts of the minutiae space industry. Luckily, they chose to make their book relevant to people interested in more general aspects of Japanese politics, and the alliance with the United States. The insight paid off, as the book provides an excellent look into the surprising indigenous development of space capability in Japan.

The central point of the book can be summarized with a line from the preface: "Japan has the technical wherewithal to be marked as a military space power and now has placed national security as the centerpiece of its space development strategy." You might be asking yourself when this happened, or how. Well, the authors are well aware of this predicament. In fact, the greatest developments in Japanese space capabilities have taken place out of sight of the media, which only reports a few rocket tests and ballistic missile defense. Instead, they testify that "important answers lie in the market" (2). Oddly, failed investments in space technology over the long run only forced companies to increase those investments to try to cut their losses by coming up with a successful technology. In the end, this sphere proved the most profitable for companies, and the prospect of dual-use civilian/military technologies made the investment worthwhile. These militarily relevant expenditures have translated into military-capable space infrastructure.

Still, there is no cohesive national structure for space exploration/arms development in Japan. Several conferences have discussed the issue, and left the door open for development, but constitutional constraints against rearming have left murky any attempt to centralize the process. Weird that something so complex can emerge with so little bureaucracy, yet civilian and commercial parties control the space "program."

The authors offer a reason for the lack of attention paid to this novel development. They talk about how debates about Japan don't focus on whether they have space capability, but rather just war over which international relations theory should be used to understand Japan, and how that relates to their pacifist nature relates to their ability to militarize. Odd that actual developments should fall through the cracks.

The whole thing is summed up pretty well by reviewer Andrew Nathan in Foreign Affairs:

Today, in addition to ballistic missile defense capabilities developed in cooperation with the United States, Japan is working on reusable launch vehicles (that is, space planes); satellites that detect missiles and help with navigation, communication, and targeting; warhead reentry technologies that can advance the use of missiles in warfare; unmanned aerial vehicles; and technologies for "space situational awareness," which reveal a concern about possible future conflict in space. It is too soon to count Japan out in the arms race in Asia.

Perhaps more surprising than scary at this point, but interesting and worth investigating nonetheless.

Japan and the Other

Today in English class we were discussing the idea of the Other. To summarize the concept, the Other is essentially what "we" (whatever the norm is in a given culture) are not. That is, if we are male, the Other is female. If we are white, then the Other is a racial minority. In this way, all cultures (not just ours) define themselves, establishing a firm identity by contrasting it with alternatives. In a sense, the Other is essential to understanding the Self. Still, use of the Other becomes problematic when a culture becomes too dominant and exploitative, uses the Other to mark those who don't belong, and uses violence or other means to exclude them. Creating the Other can also greatly hamper cross-cultural communication, since the Other can be construed as an inferior, and therefore unworthy of being taken seriously or without a contribution to be made.

Obviously, these problems carry over to our relationship with Japan. To avoid rephrasing something in a worse form than the original, here's the abstract to an excellent paper on the subject, which I will continue to cite throughout this paper:

This paper tries to show how cross-cultural conflict often occurs between Japan and Westerners as the result of imposing one's own cultural meanings onto another culture. Interpretations of Japan, as well as other Asian cultures, often carries an implicit assumption that the West is rational (and superior) whereas the East is bound by ancient traditions (and is inferior). "Orientalism" has been identified as the particular form that Western stereotypical understandings of Asian cultures has taken. Intercultural communication becomes highly problematic as long as stereotypes are held and as long as the other culture is seen as foreign and wholly other. By transcending this "Orientalism" we will be in a better position to understand and communicate with those from another culture without having to set up a dichotomous boundary between "us" and "them." Conflict with Japan is focused on 1) because there seems to be a lot of it, and 2) because Japan represents a unique culture field which is, in some ways, both modern and familiar, yet in other ways seemingly foreign to Western interpretive structures. This paper will call into question some of the stereotypes that Westerners often project onto Japan as being a monolithic culture which is excessively authoritarian, hierarchical, and patriarchal. We will try to offer some other interpretive options for understanding a culture which has suffered from intercultural communication problems for so long.

Some of what's going on in that abstract requires certification higher than a middle school diploma to fully flesh out (don't worry, I'll have a high school diploma soon), but, without getting bogged down in some of the more esoteric terminology or concepts, and perhaps staying away from the gritty details of the field of Japanese cultural studies, we can draw out a few key points.

-We stereotype and assume superiority when trying to understand Japan

When understanding Japan, we all too often imagine Japanese as efficient, dependent, and polite. The implication becomes that Japanese are conformist- incompatible with Western ideals of the individual and rights, and simply different and inferior.

-That makes it hard to communicate across cultures

When we assume someone is that inferior, it makes hard for us to imagine any benefit to communication. Additionally, some aspects of the stereotype- such as Japanese being unable to express their opinions or communicate without Japanese- make it seem to us as if we are unable to communicate with Japanese. That only furthers the stereotype, because there's no chance for it to be broken down.

-There are ways to end this predicament

Rosen (in the article cited above) has a few suggestions from other sources: Using an idea from Hinduism to open ourselves to other ideas, and learning the same language so communication is easier.

Though those options seem less than practical, it probably is important to bear in mind the stereotypes we use to understand people, and actively resist them. Pointing out and acknowledging them is the first step.

A personal touch-

While I'm familiar with the stereotypes and attitude explained above- especially in the extreme forms portrayed in the media like a Japanese takeover of our economy- I have to say I've had so little personal experience with either ethnic or native Japanese that these stereotypes, no matter how distilled or thought through, are truly all that dictate my understanding of what a Japanese person is like. Accordingly, when I read an article about something like Japanese politics, my only context for really understanding Japanese political dynamics is to assume their politicians behave as we do. The problem is when Japanese politicians do and say things American politicians would never do or say. See sub-point #3 here. In these cases, statements like that of Ichiro Ozawa (saying he was not worthy of office but would run anyway) can only be understood within a narrative of Japanese compliance and humility, which, even if true in a way, without context creates a sense of inferiority instead of respect.

For the last few years, my neighbors across the street have been a Japanese businessman and his family. There have been two families so far, each here for two year terms. Only the men have known (some) English, although the kids and mom have an English teacher every week. I don't speak Japanese, a problem Rosen anticipates. A cultural barrier straight down the middle of my street.

Maybe it's time to ask the English teacher to do some translating.

Pearl Harbor Anniversary

Today is the anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the precursor to the current relationship between the US and Japan.

The alternatives to the current scenario are interesting. If Japan and the US had maintained an uneasy peace, could they have compromised over the Pacific sphere rather than fight over it?Would China ever have emerged as a power had the US not so thoroughly decimated Japanese influence?

Regardless, one thing is clear. Pearl Harbor preceded great bloodshed by both the Japanese and American peoples. Whatever complaints one has about the way geopolitics work today, we are certainly in a better place.

Japan and Muslim Women

In English class, we're reading Reading Lolita in Tehran. It's written by Iranian expatriate and American Literature professor Azar Nafisi about her experiences teaching American literature in Iran during and after the Islamic Revolution. For detailed chapter summaries, check here. If you're not in a reading (except for my blog) mood, just know that the themes in the book have a lot to do with Nafisi and her female students forging unique identities in spite of government control over how they dress, look, act, and live.

You might be wondering, how does this possibly connect to Japan? After all, Japan isn't exactly known for religious diversity. However, .2% of the Japanese population calls itself Muslim. If you think this percentage is insignificant, just remember .2% of people in the world are Jewish. Muslims have been in Japan for only about 100 years, and are thought to have originally come when some Tartar Muslims were escaping the Russians. The population is highly convert-driven, but Muslim businessmen are also coming now. For information, check here.

Businessmen is where the business of today's post begins. Like many men, these Muslim businessmen seek to marry once they come to Japan. Obviously there aren't very many eligible Japanese Muslim bachelorettes, so often they take native Japanese wives. These wives often convert to Islam as a condition of marriage because of religious doctrine.

As the director of the Islamic Center of Japan puts it, "Women are attracted to Islam because they want freedom. Islam gives them independence because they do not have to be a slave of any man. Islam is against moral aggression against women. The chastity and honor of women are protected. No illicit relations are allowed. All these things attract women."

The article, originally published in the Japan Times, goes on to discuss the difficulties Muslim women face living in Japan. The Islamic lifestyle is radically different than that of most Japanese: different clothing like headscarves, different rituals like prayer, and different social customs like no drinking. Within the article, it is speculated that the difference and rigidness of Islam might attract some women.

It is interesting to see the contrast between Reading Lolita, where the less fundamental Muslim is the minority, and Japan, where the observant Muslim is in the minority. It seems like it might be easier for the Japanese women to find meaning in their religion then it is for Nafisi to do so, simply because it becomes an active choice versus a forced one. Being a minority is hard, but the article (although it predates 9/11) doesn't really mention persecution. In that context, Islam can be regarded as a rewarding lifestyle. That's a counter-narrative to the way we regard Islam in popular culture.

Japan as Cornerstone

In English class we recently spent some time discussing metaphors and their use in our culture and daily speech. Some of these qualify as conventional metaphors, so embedded in the way we understand life we don't even notice they're there. For instance, we commonly refer to death as departure (she's left us), or love as a fire (his passion burns for her), but how often do we choose these metaphors or notice we're using them? These contrast with original metaphors, used by poets and other communicators to make points in a creative manner.

The metaphor I want to explore in the context of Japan is somewhere between conventional and original: it was created and is no way cultural, but it has been used in discourse about the alliance for over 30 years. The metaphor, shockingly enough after the title for this post, is Japan as a the cornerstone of US security efforts in Asia.

I thought about creating a cool graphic juxtaposing a map of East Asia with the image of a cornerstone, but I lack the technical skill.

As far as I can tell, after somewhat intensive and comprehensive research of news sources via Lexisnexis, the first American politician to refer to Japan as "the cornerstone of stability in the vast reaches of Asia and the Pacific" was Gerald Ford in April of 1975 while at a conference with other Asian nations like Australia, New Zealand, and Indonesia.

Apparently Jimmy Carter picked up on the metaphor, because the following year he made it part of his platform while running for President. The US News and World Report from July 26, 1976 quotes the platform as calling Japan the "cornerstone of our Asian interests and policy."

Carter and his administration continued this policy throughout his presidency-

6/8/77- "[Appointed Japanese Ambassador Mike] Mansifed, 74, said that he was carrying Carter's message that the closest possible ties with Japan are 'the cornerstone of American foreign policy.'" Washington Post

3/20/78- "(Significantly, China recently told Japan's Socialist Party that China tacitly supports the U.S.-Japan security treaty, the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the Far East.)" Forbes Magazine

3/8/79- "Both President Carter and Prime Minister Ohira took the opportunity of their meeting to stress anew the importance of the relationship of the two countries. President Carter said, "we consider the relationship with japan to be the cornerstone of the implementation of american policy throughout Asia." Ohira said, "in all aspects of Japan's foreign policy, our partnership with the United States is pivotal." U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke also had this to say: the political and strategic relations of the two countries have become 'closer than any time in memory'." Xinhua News Service

Something eerie

9/23/10- "Obama met Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan in New York, hours after holding talks with China's Premier Wen Jiabao, amid heightened tensions between Tokyo and Beijing over a dispute in the East China sea. 'We have reaffirmed the importance of the US-Japan alliance not only to regional stability, not only to the security of both our countries,' Obama said, after the talks with Kan. 'We believe it's one of the cornerstones of peace and security throughout the world.'" AFP

30 years later the alliance is still cached in similar terms by US leaders. The alliance is still a cornerstone. Now, what exactly is a cornerstone?

Princeton's Wordnet offers several definitions. The first is "basis: the fundamental assumptions from which something is begun or developed or calculated or explained," which is instructive in understanding the use of the term in the context of the alliance, but already rests on a metaphor for what a real cornerstone is: a stone in the exterior of a large and important building.

What happens when we understand the Japanese alliance as foundational to the building of US power in Asia? We view it as static, reliable, but also unchanging and perhaps not requiring change. As is illustrated in a quote from the Gerald Curtis' chapter in the new book Getting the Triangle Straight; Managing China-Japan-U.S. Relations,

"Americans are fond of referring to the alliance with Japan as the “cornerstone” of US policy in East Asia. It is an apt metaphor because a cornerstone just sits there; it is inanimate and reliable, something you can confidently build upon. But the Japanese cornerstone is shifting."

It seems that when we tell Japan and the world that Japan is our "cornerstone," we've always been able to reassure Japan of our commitment. Yet this reassurance is in many ways a threat. If the cornerstone comes out, the whole building comes down. The weight of the imperial edifice (speaking of metaphors) seems to rest in some ways on Japan's shoulders. So while the metaphor of Japan as cornerstone certainly captures an amount of mutual dependence and allegiance, it also dares Japan to try to stop relying on the US for its security. The part of the metaphor which prevents Japan from deeply challenging the alliance structure also makes it inflexible, and perhaps unable to respond to new challenges facing the alliance.

Can a cornerstone really shift?

New Article in the Economist

Great new article in The Economist about Japanese diplomatic challenges, the Asian aging crisis, and regional soft power.

Japan and Obama

Those of you unconcerned with international diplomacy, or, apparently, the budget might not have noticed that President Obama recently traveled all around Asia. He went to India, his childhood home in Indonesia, South Korea, and Japan. As Jay Leno joked on his show, Obama still hasn't found his birth certificate.

Obama did stop in Japan.

What Obama Did

Rather than deal with actual people due to the complexity of the issues he faces, Obama instead chose to meet with Giant Buddhas and robots.

It would appear he can't even figure the robot out, let alone Japan-US relations.

After he was done meeting with inanimate (no matter how lifelike) objects, the president also stopped over at the APEC economic summit on the sides of which he met with Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan, reassuring him of the US commitment to Japan and Northeast Asian security, especially relative to China, and inviting Kan to visit America in the spring all in the course of an hour.

Does it Matter?

If expectations were high running into the trip, it might've been overly optimistic given the current state of our economy and international standing. However, there is no doubt that failure to pass free trade agreements in South Korea, or make significant headway on Chinese currency issues, regional island disputes, or resolve accompanying tensions certainly prevent the trip from being labeled a success. However, expecting Obama to wave away all these complex issues with a magic wand is probably setting the (magical) bar too high.

There might've been a point where an American President could go overseas and have people tell if not give him whatever they wanted. However, as alluded to in the Stephen Walt post referenced above and here, that time has passed. Other nations are aware that America's time as a total superpower has passed, and, especially on regional issues involving players like China, other countries will become crucial and perhaps necessary to forging progress.

That means that even though conservative editorials in Japan will continue to herald the US-Japanese relationship, and although the relationship will probably remain strong, progress will be much slower than if the US could simply impose its will on the region.